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I. INTRODUCTION
Securitizations,' or asset-backed transactions, have matured into a $400
billion per year industry in the United States. 2 These transactions have picked
up fervor in Latin America as well.3 Companies in Mexico, especially midsize
and small companies, have trouble raising capital to fund their expenses, to
expand, and remain competitive in the global market. Securitization
transactions can be a solution to this problem. Securitizations offer funds to
companies at a lower cost because of the lower transaction costs. Large
companies, however, have traditionally only had access to these markets
because of the large amount of funds needed to take advantage of the lower
transaction costs and lower interest rates.
The financial market was especially favorable to securitization transactions
until the Asian financial crises. Although the Latin American market's initial
reaction was a dramatic reduction in liquidity, higher interest rates, and shorter
repayment terms, there has been increased awareness of asset-backed
transactions in this region.4 This, however, has been dampened by the
devaluation of the Brazilian Real, which may lead to a downward spiral for all
of Latin American economies, including Mexico, the focus of this article.
In the past, only large companies have had access to the securitization
market, offerings over $100 million. "[F]oreign banks are comfortable lending
to only about 100 companies" in Mexico because of their track record and
substantial amount of exporting.5 This excludes the smaller and midsize
companies, even those that are suppliers to the giant companies.6
Securitization transactions would enable the smaller to midsize companies
in Mexico to obtain much needed finance to help them compete in the global
economy. This, in turn, would boost Mexico's economy and prevent a
devaluation of their currency.
This article discusses securitizations generally in Part I and compares
securitization transactions in the United States to those originating in Mexico
Securitizatioans generally are transactions converting cash generating assets into marketable
securities. See infra Part Ill.
2
See Timothy C. Leixner, Address to the Forbes Magazine and Council of the Americas, The
Latin American Market, Asset Securitization Overview and Current Issues (November 17-19, 1998) (on
file with author).
See id.
See Trade Finance a Supplement to Project Finance, Latin American Structured Trade Finance,
Working out the Right Recipe, PROJECT & TRADE FIN., Sept. 10, 1998, at 24. (hereinafter "Trade Finance")
Thomas S. Heather & Martha Traudt Collins, Secured Financingof Machinery and Equipment,
Including Cross-BorderLeasing and ConditionalSales Contracts,5 U.S.-MEx. LJ. 23,25 (1997).
6
See id.
3
4
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in Parts II and Ill. Finally in Part IV, this article discusses the future of these
securitization transactions in Mexico.
A. What is an Asset-backed Securitization?
An asset-backed securitization may be defined as a transaction whereby
an entity ("Originator") "securitizes" its future cash flows or receivables by
conveying them to another entity often a trust ('Trust") set up specifically for
this purpose and is typically owned by the firm.7 The trust structure is
beneficial because it avoids taxation at the entity level.' This can be in the
form of a true sale or a secured loan, depending on the desires of the
Originator in terms of accounting purposes and bankruptcy protection. 9 The
Trust ("Issuer") issues debt and/or equity securities (often commercial paper)
in a public or private offering.'" Investors purchase the debt or equity sales
and the funds flow back from the investors, through the Issuer/Trust and back
to the Originator to repay the2 loan." This is the simplest way to structure an
asset-backed securitization.1
The payments on the receivables (for example, car payments) are collected
by a servicing entity ("Servicer") that is often the Originator. 3 The payments
are deposited and invested in accounts under the control of a trustee, usually
a bank, and disbursed to the security holders in payment of the securities."'
A more complicated structure involves the use of a conduit Issuer, maintained
by banks and investment bankers. ' The Issuer/conduit aggregates receivables
purchased from Originators that do not have large enough receivables to do a
"stand alone" transaction on their own. 6 Standard and Poor's established
criteria for and assigned a rating to the first asset-backed commercial paper7
1
conduit, Commercial Industrial Trade Receivables Investment Co. (Ciesco).
There are two types of conduits: multiseller conduits that aggregated
unaffiliated originators and single seller conduits that finance the assets of a

s

See Leixner, supra note 2, at 1.
See id at 2.

9
10

Seeid. ati.
See id. at 2.

1

See id at2.

12

See id. at 1.

13

See Leixner, supra note 2, at 2-3.
See id. at 2.

14

Is
16

17

See id. at 3.
See id.
Standard &

Poor's Asset-Backed

Commercial

http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/definitions/compaper.htm
Standard& Poor's Criteria).

Paper Criteria, available

at

(last visited Jan. 26,1999) (hereinafter
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single originator.' 8 Conduits enable smaller to midsize companies in Latin
America to take advantage of the securitization market because they can pool
their funds together.
Credit enhancements are necessary in every transaction to reduce the risks
to the investors and increase the rating of the transaction. 9 Credit enhancements include a reserve fund, cash collateral account, security bond, early
amortization, letters of credit, senior/subordinated structure, liquidity provider,
and overcollateralization. Overcollateralization involves transferring to the
issuer more money than required to pay the securities.2 The amount varies,
usually from 5% to 20%, and is determined by the quality of the receivables,
risk of the structure, economic conditions, and nature of the industry.22
B. What Assets can be Securitized?
Any asset providing a predictable cash flow can be securitized. 23 For
example, residential mortgages, home equity loans, commercial and construction loans, auto loans and leases, credit card receivables, student loans, trade
receivables (i.e. toll road receipts and receivables from petroleum production
in Mexico), and record album receivables (i.e. David Bowie and Pavarotti)
have all been securitized.24
David Bowie's $55 million "David Bowie bonds" were the first music
royalties future receivable securitization; they were backed by royalties on a
catalogue of Bowie's recordings and song copyrights.25 This was an especially
attractive deal since the coupon interest rate is 7.9% for the life of the deal as
opposed to 6.37% on the new 10-year Treasury note.26 Moody's rated the
offering at A3. 27 Almost anything can be securitized!
C. What are the Benefits of Securitization?
A benefit of a securitization transaction is that the Originator's balance
sheet improves because the assets have been sold to another entity and
1s

See id at 4,7.

19
Zo
21

See Leixner, supra note 2, at 4.
See id. at 4-5.
See id. at 4.

22

See id

23

See id at 1.

U

See id

2

See Sam Adler, DavidBowie $55 Million Haul, Using a Musician's Assets to Structurea Bond

Offering, 13 ENT. L &FIN. 1 (1997).
26

See id.

27

See id.
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replaced by cash. 28 This is similar to factoring of account receivables.29
Securitization differs from factoring accounts receivables because a company
securitizes their future flows, as opposed to past flows, or money already due.
The Originator then has immediate access to those funds, instead of waiting
for the payment of the future flow, the mortgage or auto loan, for example."
This can be very beneficial to small and midsize companies that need
immediate access to liquid funds and cannot wait for the future flows.
If the Originator were to raise the funds by selling the securities directly,
the Originator would be subject to the claims of security holders, at least in the
case of bankruptcy. Only the Trust is subject to the bankruptcy claims and is
"bankruptcy-proof'. 3' Moreover, the securities are rated higher by the rating
agency because the company's entire balance sheet is not subject to the rating
agency's scrutiny so as to reduce the cost to the Originator when compared to
traditional forms of financing, like a simple loan.32 In the same respect, the
Originator, if privately held like JM Family Enterprises, as discussed in infra
in lIB, does not have to make public their company's financial condition. In
addition, since the Originator acts as Servicer, there is no need to give notice
to the obligors.33 This is especially beneficial to Latin American companies
that need to raise capital, but cannot because of the Mexican peso rating
ceiling and the rating problems due to the inherent risk in a foreign entity.
Foreign entities, especially those in Latin America trying to raise capital
in the United States can obtain a lower interest rate. Many Latin American
firms that are solid in structure have had trouble attracting investors because
of the defaults in the early and mid-1980s.3 4 The result was that Latin
American firms often had to pay higher interest rates because of the market.35
Securitizations allow the entity, or Originator to obtain more attractive interest
rates because they raise capital in the United States instead of in their country.
In addition, political and currency risks are diminished. The investors are
repaid from the future cash flows, or funds never located in the politically
risky country or its currency.36 Despite the recent devaluation of the Brazilian
real and the Mexican peso financial crises of the 1980s and 1994/1995,

28
29

See Leixner, supra note 2, at 2.
See id.

See id.
See id. at 3.
32
See id.
3
See id.
U
See Claire A. Hill, Latin American Securitization: The Case of the DisappearingPolitical Risk,
38 VA. J. INT'L L 293, 294 (1998).
35
See id. at 296-97.
36
See id at 297.
30
H'

200

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:195

securitizations offer a viable option in raising capital in Latin American
countries.
The most attractive feature to a securitization transaction is the large
spread between the percent paid on commercial paper and the company's
financing alternative, often a loan from a bank."

II. NATURE OF SECURITIZATIONS ORIGINATING IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Typical Structure
Securitizations in the United States generally take two forms: mortgage
backed and asset-backed securitizations. Mortgage backed securities were the
beginning of the modem securitization transaction beginning in the early
1970s. 8
Domestic securitizations can take place in one of two ways, generally:
with the use of a conduit or without. The basic structure, described supra in
Section I is without a conduit, also known as a stand-alone securitization. A
conduit is a limited-purpose finance company, often a large bank issuing
commercial paper to finance the purchase of assets.39 Standard & Poor's
established the first conduit, Commercial Industrial Trade Receivales
Investment Company (Ciesco).' Standard & Poor's now commands a 100%
market share of asset-backed commercial paper ratings.4 The advantage to
using a conduit lies in the fact that the allocation of legal and structural risks
is spread among the liquidity banks.42
1.

SECURITIES ACT AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

The Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") makes it unlawful for any person
to sell a security through instruments of interstate commerce unless a
registration statement is in effect with respect to such security.43 As a result,
the commercial paper the Trust issues is defined as a security." However, the
majority of the commercial paper issued as a result of the securitization is an

37
39

See id
See id at 294.
See Standard & Poor's Criteria, supra note 17.

40

See id

41
42

See id
See id

43

See 15 U.S.C. §77e (1999).

4

See id. § 77b.

38
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exempt transaction within the 1933 Act because it is -privately placed."
Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act exempts transactions "by an issuer not involving
any public offering." However, this transaction exemption is not used often
since the introduction of Regulation D.47
Regulation D has three exemptions: Rule 504 exempts offerings up to $1
million;48 Rule 505 exempts offerings up to $5 million;49 and Rule 506
exempts offerings with no dollar limit, but the offering can only be sold to
thirty-five non-accredited investors and an unlimited amount of accredited
investors. 50 Accredited investors include banks, insurance companies,
investment companies, savings associations, corporations, partnerships and
business trusts with total assets in excess of $5 million, among others. 5'
Resales of exempt securities must find an exemption within the 1933 Act
or be subject to registration.5 2 Rule 144A solyed some of the uncertainty in
this area by creating a safe harbor from the registration requirements of
Section 5 for resales to "Qualified Institutional Buyers" (QIBs). 53 QIBs are
defined in Rule 144A to include investment companies and business
development companies, corporations, partnerships, employee
benefit plans,
4
more.
or
million
$25
of
worth
net
a
among others, having
Those transactions that are not privately placed must be registered under
both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. 5 Section 13 of the 1934 Act requires the
issuer to file annual reports, quarterly reports, and special events reports. 6 The
securitization transactions are subject to the 1934 Act anti-fraud rules, most
importantly Rule lOb-5.5 7 Both the privately and publicly sold commercial
paper are subject to the 1934 Act.5"

45

See id. § 77d.

46

Id.

See Michael S. Garnbro & Scott Leichtner, Selected Legal Issues Affecting Securitization, I N.C.
BANKING INST. 131, 134(1997).
48
See 15 U.S.C. §77d.
49
See id.
so
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-.506 (1999).
s1
See id § 230.501.
52
See Gambro & Leichtner, supra note 47, at 136.
53
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1999).
47

54

5s
56
57

53

See id.
See Gambro & Leichtner, supra note 47,at 136.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1999).
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1999).
See Gambro & Leichtner, supra note 47, at 141.
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RATING AGENCY - STANDARD & POOR'S

2.

The rating agencies - Moody' s, Standard & Poor's, Fitch IBCA, and Duff
& Phelps play an active role in the structure of the transaction and often
require changes in structure and servicing procedure. 59 Standard & Poor's
6
commands a 100% market share of asset-backed commercial paper ratings. 0
The rating process begins with the company approaching Standard and Poor's
(hereinafter "S & P") and ends when S & P issues a rating letter. 6' In addition,
S & P conducts ongoing management reviews and surveillance to monitor the
receivable pools.62 If at any time S & P feels that there is a substantial decline
in the performance of assets, S & P can downgrade the rating.63
B. World Omni FinancialCompany
World Omni Financial Company (WOFCO) is a subsidiary of JM Family
Enterprises, a privately held automobile company." 'WOFCO handles
consumer loans for automobiles, auto leases, dealer floor plans, and other
fimancing techniques.65 In one recent transaction, WOFCO securitized these
auto leases by assigning the lease contracts and leased vehicles to the
origination trust, World Omni LT, which issued an undivided trust interest to
Auto Lease Finance L.P. (ALFI)." The trustee of the origination trust creates
a separate portfolio within World Omni LT and a SUBI is sold to the
transferor, World Omni Lease Securitization, L.P. (WOLSI). 67 WOLSI
contributes 99.8% of the SUBI to World Omni 1997-B Automobile Lease
Securitization Trust and retains a .2% interest in the assets.68 The trust can
now issue notes.
In this transaction, WOFCO has employed a multitrache setup with four
senior classes and one subordinate class. 69 The four senior classes are publicly

60

See Leixner, supra note 2, at 4.
See Standard& Poor's Criteria,supra note 17.

61

See id.

62

See id

59

See id
See World Omni Automobile Lease Securitization Trust 1997-B, Structured Finance AssetBacked New Issue, available at http://www.fitchibca.com (last visited Jan. 26, 1999).
63
6

65

See id

See id.
67

See id

"

See i
See id.

0
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placed, and the fifth is privately placed, due to the lower rating.7" There is a
one-year revolving period where the noteholders receive interest only, and
thereafter receive principle in monthly payments." The initial contracts
consist of 49,166 fixed rate, closed end lease contracts with an approximate
initial value of $112 billion with an aggregate residual value of $833 million.'
There is a 1% servicing fee and the coupon pays 6.2% to investors.73
1. RATING AGENCY - FITCH IBCA
Fitch IBCA rated the class A securities AAA, in part due to credit
enhancement because of the subordination of the 5.25% class B principle, the
over-collateralization that builds up as the senior classes pay down, and the
residual value insurance policy provided by AISLIC.74 Investors are also
protected by the subordination of the 1% servicing fee and servicer
advances
75
on schedules payments past due for thirty-one days or more.
2. RISK OF DEFAULT
As with any financing, there is always risk of default. However, WOFCO
has not yet defaulted on their obligations. 7 6 S & P ensures that there is no
default by monitoring the delinquency rate for three months and if it is greater
than 1.75% or the charge-off exceeds 2.75%, then the reserve account will
grow to the lesser of 100% of the current certificate balance, or 2.0 times the
initial reserve requirement.77
HI. NATURE OF SECURITIZATIONS ORIGINATING IN MEXICO
A. Typical Structure
The Mexican legal structure has many problems that create impediments
to securitization transactions. It is virtually impossible to structure a
transaction in the Mexican market, and is still complicated to structure a
transaction through the United States' market. Mexico's difficulties include

70

See id.

71

See id.

72

See id
See id.
See id

73
74
75
76

77

See id.
See iL
See id
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the length of adjudication, the lack of trust law, problems with possession and
security interests, including the lack of a comparable U.C.C. Article 9, and
bankruptcy law.
Mexico follows a civil law tradition, as opposed to a common law
tradition. The code is the first place that a lawyer looks to find the meaning
of or a solution to a legal problem. 8 When there is a trial in Mexico, it is very
unlike the United States' common law trial, and tends to take much longer.79
The end result is that when there is a problem interpreting Mexican Civil
Code, the process could take years, thus the company or entity cannot proceed
with transactions.
The most prevalent problem for Mexican securitizations is the difficulty
with trust law, or trust law similar to that-in the United States. This presents
a problem because the Originator needs to sell the assets to the bankruptcy
remote Trust. By law, trusts in Mexico cannot issue debt, therefore the paper
would have to be issued through securities called Certificados de Participacion
Ordinaria, or CPOs, with Nafin ealuating the assets backing the CPOs and
certifying that the value of the assets is equal to the mortgage-backed
security.' Argentina and Venezuela have limited the use of trusts to alleviate
this problem.8'
Mexico does recognize security interests and the most common method is
to take a mortgage, or "hipoteca" that creates a lien in favor of the creditor.8 2
Mexican law defines real property broadly and a mortgage is "a proper method
to take a security interest ... from livestock to aircraft." 3 However, Mexico
does not favor self-help remedies, as in the United States, and foreclosures
must be carried out judicially.8 4 This is problematic because of the duration
of time to carry out judicial remedies in Mexico, as noted above.
An alternative to a secured creditor in Mexico is the use of a trust, or a
"fideicomiso," which can be used in real or personal property.8" A trust is
different than a mortgage because the debtor must convey the property to a
trust administered by a bank and the creditor is the beneficiary. 6 Trusts are
also not practical because of the costs and the registration fee varies depending

7
See Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Conference on Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Latin
America: New Approaches: Looking to the Twenty-First Century, I1 FLA. J. INT'L L 1, 70 (1996).
7
See id at 72.
to
See id.
91
See Leixner, supra note 2, at 6.
82
See John A. Barrett, Jr., Mexican Insolvency Law, PACE INT'L L REV. 431,437 (1995).
'3
Id.
U
See id at 438.
S
See id at 439.
8

See id.
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on the property." For personal property, a pledge, or "prenda" can be used to
grant a security interest to the creditor, but like the trust, the assets covered
usually must be given to the creditor.88 This creates problems when the assets
are inventory or equipment, because the debtor cannot give up possession of
their inventory or equipment since it is necessary in their business transactions.
This problem with possession has resulted in few United States' banks lending
money under these circumstances. 8 9 In addition, the security agreement must
be registered and is expensive, in part because of the registration duties that
must be paid. 90 However, Mexican banks can perfect their interest simply by
delivering invoices and naming the company as the depository.9 ' This
advantage should be made available to all banks, not just Mexican banks,
providing Mexican companies with needed access to funds.
There is also a problem with industrial mortgages issued in favor of nonMexican banks. 9 Mexican law clearly disfavors non-Mexican banks.93 These
outdated laws must be changed to provide for more equal footing for nonMexican banks. Allowing more non-Mexican banks to participate would be
beneficial to companies in Mexico because they would have the ability to
borrow more money and with more competition, the rates would be more
favorable to the companies.
Under Mexican Bankruptcy Law, proceedings are considerably longer
than in the United States, often spanning many years. 94 Due to the extensive
length of bankruptcy, trustee and investigator fees can be considerable.9"
Mexican Bankruptcy Law is "old and relatively poorly constructed. It has not
been updated . . .complex multi-national corporations and sophisticated
commercial financing... and is time consuming and expensive.... ."9 In
addition, the Bankruptcy Law is ambiguous which has lead to its inconsistent
application by the courts."' Because of the difficulty in obtaining secured
collateral and proceedings against such collateral, creditors are hesitant to
extend credit to Mexican businesses. 98

87

See Heather & Collins, supra note 5, at 27.
See Barret, supra note 82, at 440.
See Heather & Collins, supra note 5, at 25.

'o

See id

91

See id at 26.
See id at 27.

92

93
"

95
9

8

See id. at 28.
See Barrett, supra note 82, at 460.
See id. at 461.
id.at 462.
See id. at 436.
See id. at 434.
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Sovereign risk is also a prominent problem. Mexico could intervene in the
flow of funds, the ability of the collection of receivables, and other aspects of
the transaction." Sovereign risk also includes the additional tax burdens,
government instability, the ability of the servicer and trustee to enforce the
collection of receivables, restrictions on transfer of funds out of the country,
and the unpredictable nature of the Mexican court system.100 This has blocked
the ability to have in-country securitizations.' °1
Because of these impediments in the Mexican market and Mexican laws,
Mexican securitization transactions are- typically set up through the United
States, using American banks, currency denominated in dollars, and the
American securities market.
B. Mexican Securitization- TelMex
The first Latin American securitization transaction was by the Mexican
telephone company, TelMex. TelMex securitized its future telephone
receivables from AT&T.'0 2 AT&T billed the calls made from the United
States to Mexico and TelMex billed for the calls made from Mexico to the
United States.0 3 Because more phone calls originated in the United States,
AT&T owed TelMex a substantial amount every month. "' TelMex securitized
the future amounts owed to it by AT&T in a transaction that was not
considered risky because the receivables were payable in dollars and the
likelihood of people in the United States not calling Mexico was remote."'
The transaction was a private transaction." 6
C. Mexican Securitization- Mexican Toll Roads
Mexico securitized future tolls in the early 1990's by issuing three toll
road bonds. 7 One of the bonds, MC Cuernavaca Trust, was lowered from
BBB to BBB- by S & P in 1997 and the ratings outlook is negative.0 8 Some
of the problems were due to currency fluctuations, while other problems were

99

See Leixner, supra note 2, at 6.

100

See id.

101

See id.

'o

i'

See Hill, supra note 34, at 307.
See id.

10,

See idL

105

See id.

106

See id.

107

See Marissa C. Wesely, Securitizing Project Debt, 747 PU/CoMM 335,371 (1995).

108

See Salomon Still Sweet on Tolls, AssET SALES REP., Oct. 13, 1997, at 1.
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due to trickling traffic levels and local corruption.' 09 In an attempt to bail the
bond issuers out, the government nationalized the roads and negotiated with
the creditors who held the securitization notes." 0 This transaction, which was
the only one denominated in pesos, was negatively affected by currency
fluctuation brought about by the peso collapse in late 1994 and early 1995."'
However, it has been argued that these bonds have not "performed
markedly worse than Mexican corporate issues post-devaluation, although
their market is far more illiquid."' 12 In addition, supporters of toll roads argue
that these transactions provide a fast track to infrastructure in emerging
markets and this gives the private sector the opportunity to step in where the
government cannot be as efficient." 3
D. Mexican Securitization - Pemex
In 1993, Pemex (Petroleos Mexicanos), a Mexican oil company that sells
Mexican Maya crude oil to U.S. based oil companies, securitized future oil
sales. PMI, a majority owned subsidiary of Pemex, generated receivables from
its sales to U.S. customers.
The structure of the transaction involved a limited liability company,
Pemex Finance. Pemex Finance was established by Pemex under Cayman
Island law and sought to raise $366 million in a private placement transaction
in the United States. 14 Pemex Finance issued the debt and used the proceeds
to purchase current and future receivables.' The assets were a "true sale" so
6
as to avoid non-payment of the investors in the event of bankruptcy."
Mexican transactions require a carefully designed structure so as to assure
a high rating by the rating agency. Sovereign risk is mitigated by the structure
of the transaction so that Mexico would have to either "redirect the product to
other customers who have not signed a designated customer notice, or cause
designated customers to make payments directly to an account other than the
collection account established for the benefit of the note holders."" 7

109

See id.

Ito

See id

III

See id.

112

Wesely, supra note 107, at 372.
See Salomon Still Sweet on Tolls, supra note 108, at 1.
See Charles E. Harrell et al., Securitization of Oil, Gas, and Other Natural Resource Assets:

113
114

Emerging Financing Techniques, 52 BUS. LAW. 885, 904 (1997).
115
See Standard & Poor's, Structures Finance Presale Report, Pemex Finance Ltd., Dec. 3, 1998.
116
See id.
117

Id. at4.
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Pemex Finance is required to maintain a ratio of total senior indebtedness
to equity of less than or equal to seven to one."' If a customer defaults on
payment of a receivable, the amount to pay the debt service will be reduced,
and the senior note holders must absorb the losses if the aggregate loss exceeds
the amount of subordination. 19 This is unlikely, however as PMI has not
suffered any losses as a result of a customer defaulting in payments from 1993
until 1998.120 Pemex Finance must also maintain a debt-service-coverage ratio
of at least three to one to maintain its over collateralization. 2 '
Pemex Finance must retain a retention account, which becomes relevant
if a specified event has been declared, and there is a financial guarantee
insurance policy that unconditionally and irrevocably guarantees timely
payment of interest and principal." Moreover, S & P gets opinions that the
transfer of receivables from PMI to PMI Services and the transfers from PMI
Services to Pemex Finance constitute a true sale under Mexican, Dutch, and
Cayman Island law."2
Standard & Poor's rated the securities A; this was the first time that
"foreign currency debt securities indirectly issued by an agency of the
Mexican government have been rated higher than Mexico's foreign currency
senior debt rating of BB+."' 24 Pemex is proof that securitization transactions,
if properly structured, can be rewarding.
E. Mortgage Backed Securities
Bancomer, a commercial bank in Mexico, offered Mexico's first
mortgage-backed security in 1998.'2' S & P and Fitch IBCA have given the
mortgage pool the 'AAA' rating."2 The civil code has prolonged the delay in
this type of transaction because real estate-backed assets, until recently, "could
not be transferred due to limitations in the foreclosure civil code."' 127 Many
states have adopted foreclosure laws that make it easier for banks to seize
assets on non-performing loans.' 28 Foreclosure proceedings used to take up to
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two years, and the government is hoping to reduce this time to six months to
one year. 2 9 Purchasers will be Mexican pension funds and local insurance
companies.130
The Mexican mortgage-backed securities market is proof that with proper
government action such as changing laws to functionally execute transactions,
the government can effectuate change in the asset backed securitization
market.
In addition, federal housing fund, Fovi, is planning an offering for mid1999 " Although the set-up of a Mexican mortgage-backed securities market
has taken a long time, these transactions have laid the foundation for a
securitization market in Mexico; and if successful, those transactions could
pave the way for more transactions in the future. Moreover, JP Morgan is
considering securitizing hotels and industrial properties and has shown
confidence that the mortgage backed security market will take off by investing
$20 million for a 20% stake in a Mexican homebuilder132 However, Mexico
still lags behind Argentina, Columbia, and Brazil probably because of the
33
government's intervention in the banking system in the late 1980's.1
If "mortgage-backed securities get off the ground, [a Mexican attorney]
maintains, the whole range of cash flows securitized in other countries could
134
be securitized in Mexico as well.'
F. What is the Difference Between SecuritizationsOriginatingin
Mexico and those in the United States?
The differences between Mexican and U.S. transactions can be summed
up as follows in the following categories: currency and foreign exchange risk,
country and sovereign risk/political risk, as discussed infra, the sovereign
ceiling and the structure of the transaction.
The so called "sovereign ceiling" is a policy by the rating companies
whereby firms located in a country cannot be assigned a rating higher than that
of their sovereign. This policy has hindered Mexican companies from being
rated higher than whatever Mexico's rating was at the time of rating.'35
However, S & P no longer constrains the ratings of firms based on the
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sovereign ceiling."'36 This was apparent when, in the Pemex offering, S & P
rated the company 'A' despite Mexico's 'BB' rating, proof that Pemex rose
above Mexico's sovereign ceiling of 'BB. ' "13 The disappearance of the
sovereign ceiling is imperative for Mexican companies seeking securitization
financing at a profitable rate.
Securitizations originating in Mexico have historically been dollardenominated revenue flows, thus eliminating the foreign exchange risk.'38 The
only peso-denominated securitization, the toll roads, ran into problems and had
to be restructured.'3 9 There are few Mexican companies with access to large
dollar flows necessary to facilitate securitization."40
Mexican companies, however, may overcome these impediments by
restructuring the financing transaction, as demonstrated by Pemex. However,
the foreign exchange risk and the country/political risks are problems that
companies cannot directly affect and therefore cannot control. Therefore, the
Mexican economy and government must control these areas.

IV. FUTURE OF SECURITIZATIONS IN MEXICO

A. DisappearingEffects of the Debt Crisisof the 1980's and the Peso
Collapse of 1994/1995
The devaluation of the peso in the early 1980s and the subsequent debt
crisis devastated the Mexican economy.' 4' The peso devaluation of 1994 led
billions of dollars of foreign investment to leave Mexico.'42 This exodus led
to a downward spiral of problems because the Mexican economy was too
dependent on foreign investment. 43 However, there are signs that the
economy is rebounding. Specifically, Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Company
upgraded its rating of the U.S. $50 million Nylmex Export Receivables Master
Trust, Series 1996-A 8.57% to 'BBB', from 'BBB-' in 1997.'" The improved
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rating was due to the improved credit 45of Nylmex and the favorable outlook for
Mexican textile and apparel exports.
In late 1998, Duff & Phelps issued another improved rating for the
proposed U.S. $5 billion PEMEX Finance Ltd. Note Program from 'A-' to
'AAA'. 4 It is unusual to have an offering rated higher than the currency
rating of Mexico, at 'BB+.' The higher rating was due to the low risk of
sovereign intervention in the transaction. 47 These are all factors that indicate
that the Mexican economy is rebounding from the 1980s debt crisis.
Moreover, a Mexican attorney, Albert Saavedra, noted that "[t]he country
is in the process now of building good, efficient markets.' 4 8 With a strong
economic foundation, Mexico may be able to rebound from the effects of the
Asian and Brazilian financial crises. He also notes that Mexico's future lies
with their ability to specialize by providing services to Latin America.'4 9
B. The Effect of the Asian FinancialCrisis and the Devaluationof the
BrazilianReal
All of Latin America felt the impact of the Asian financial crisis, which led
to a dramatic reduction in liquidity, higher interest rates, and shorter repayment terms."5 In addition, risk enhanced structures, including securitization
transactions were replaced by bank credits and debt securities. 5' Although
Latin America has rebounded somewhat from this setback, the recent
devaluation of the real by Brazil is likely to cause a much more long term
problem that all of Latin America, including Mexico, will not be able to
rebound from without serious ramifications.
Although most of Latin America has experienced tighter structures and
reduced repayment terms with higher financing for export-backed transactions,
Mexico seems to be affected the least, with Brazil affected
the most (this was
52
Real).
the
of
devaluation
Brazilian
the
before
written
The effect of the devaluation of the Brazilian currency by 8% is unknown
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'
financial) take a negative turn."153
In addition, there is speculation that this
devaluation is the first of a series of devaluations that could resonate around
the Americas, including Mexico.' 54 As of January 24, 1999, the real had
already lost 30% of its value in dollar terms, compared to two weeks earlier.' 55
Such devaluation could send all of Latin America into a recession, thereby
affecting the entities that are already having trouble raising money and the
entities that have debt and/or equity securities outstanding. This would lead
to default on existing notes and start a downward spinning cycle.
There is already speculation that Mexico, in order to compete in the export
market, will devalue the peso. 56 This would be devastating not only to
securitizations originating in Mexico, but also to those originating in the
United States. The rating of the Mexican currency would likely fall from it's
current Duff & Phelps rating of 'BB+'.

C. How Should Mexican Companies Proceed?
1. CAREFUL STRUCTURING
Mexican companies can issue more securitization transactions in Pesos,
instead of dollar denominated securities. Such issuance would encourage
more investors in Mexico and other Latin American countries to become more
involved in the Mexican securitization market.
2.

SOVEREIGN/POLITICAL RISK

As noted above, it has been argued that political and sovereign risk has
diminished significantly in Mexico. This makes it easier for companies to
structure securitization transactions since the biggest hurdle for companies to
overcome is the risk of government intervention. Mexico's court system is
also troubling because of its unpredictable nature.
Sovereign risk can be avoided by structuring a deal as NylMex did by
directing proceeds from the sale of export products to a collection account in
the United States that is administered by a United States trust.'57

Such a

structure avoids Mexico's foreign currency rating of 'BB' and the so-called
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"sovereign ceiling."'' 8 In addition, Pemex's rating of A on the Pemex
Receivables U.S. Master Trust, Series 1993-1, surpassed the Mexican BB
rating because of its structure.'59 Payments are made in New York offices of
the Bank of Mexico and are dollar denominated." 6 Similarly, Mexican
companies may avoid the 'BB' rating of Mexico by properly structuring their
deal, having the transaction and payments denominated in dollars, or setting
up an offshore trust to collect payments. Generally,6 making sovereign
interference more difficult will minimize sovereign risk.' '
3.

CONDUIT

Mid-sized and small Mexican companies may be active players in the
securitization market by taking advantage of conduits, such as Ciesco,
discussed infra Part IHA. Even unaffiliated originators can combine their
assets into one diverse portfolio and attract investors. Multiseller conduits rely
on program administrators to run the program properly, much like a mutual
fund manager. 62 Smaller companies would not need the financial sophistication that the larger companies like Pemex and NylMex have acquired by doing
these transactions because they can rely on a sophisticated multiseller conduit
with vast experience.
4. PAYMENT STRUCTURE
If Mexico adopted the trust concept similar to that in the United States or
the same as recently adopted in Argentina,' 63 these transactions could be done
in-country. Moreover, with the adoption of the trust, the companies would not
have to go "offshore" to set up a transaction. The use of a corporation would
result in taxation at the Issuer level, instead of the pass-through treatment that
the trusts in the United States benefit from.'"
5.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

Credit enhancement is necessary for every transaction, and is especially
important because Mexican companies are inherently riskier than domestic

158

See id.

1s9

163

See id.
See id.
See Hill, supranote 34, at 317.
See Standard& Poor's Criteria,supra note 17, at 4.
See Hill, supranote 34, at 317.

WA

See Leixner, supranote 2, at 7.

160
161
162

214

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:195

transactions. The amount of over collateralization may be required to be
higher than the normal 5%-20% to compensate for the risk of the general
economic conditions in Mexico and the sovereign risk, including the effect of
the devaluation of the Brazilian real and the general instability of the Mexican
peso.
Rating agencies and underwriters may also require a reserve fund to be
retained by the trustee. A letter of credit may be required for the portion of
amounts due on securities, but these are not used as much today because of
their high costs. 65 The originator may have to guarantee all or a portion of
payments due on the securities or post a security bond.
In cases where there are two classes of securities issued, the structure may
be set up so that the senior securities receive payment before the subordinated
securities in the event of problems."
Although more costly, insurance is probably unavoidable for Mexican
companies. There is an increase in demand for political risk insurance and the
Export Credit Agency's support of long and medium term financing.'67
As underwriters, rating agencies, lawyers, and accountants become more
familiar with securitization structures and issues specific to Mexico, some of
these problems will be overcome.
V. CONCLUSION

All of Latin America, Mexico included, is a market that is ripe for
securitization transactions. This type of financing is appealing to both large
and midsize companies in Mexico and should be taken advantage of by
companies due to the fact that the alternative costs of financing are so high.
In light of the financial crisis in Brazil, and the likely domino effect in Mexico,
these transactions will probably be put on hold. When the economic
conditions improve in Latin America, the securitization market is likely to
improve as well.
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